Notes and commentary on the Enchiridion

                          Notes on the Greek text of the Enchiridion

                                                     Chapter 1

1.1     ἐφ' ἡμῖν ‘under our control, in our power, belonging to us’, used in this sense throughout the work.

1.1     ὑπόληψις ‘judgment’, ὁρμή ‘motivation’, ὄρεξις ‘desire’, ἔκκλισις ‘aversion’, κτλ., see the List of Philosophical Terms.

1.1     . Epictetus explains these statements more fully with practical examples as he goes along, but the immediate problem is, how do you decide what is under your control and what is not?  Judgment is affected by external factors such as bad digestion or bad information.  Who understands the workings of motivation, desire, and aversion, none of which is fully under our control.  And on the other hand people clearly do have some control over the state of their bodies and their property though maybe Epictetus is hitting closer to home with reputation and power.

1.2 κωλυτά ‘hindering’ (LSJ).

1.3     μέμνησο perfect m/p imperative of μιμνήσκομαι used frequently.

1.3  οἰηθῇς ‘think’ aor.subj. of οἴομαι;  construction is ἐάν + subjunctive/ future indicative, future more vivid condition.

1.3     ἐμποδισθήσῃ ‘you will be hindered, impeded, thwarted’ -ῃ is used throughout instead of ει for m/p pres. and fut. second person singular as would be expected in this late text (Smyth 628).

1.3     ἐγκαλέσεις ‘bring a charge against, accuse, blame’, with the dative.

1.3     People and animals do suffer.  “For there was never yet philosopher

That could endure the toothache patiently.” (Much Ado About Nothing, Act V, Scene 1).  The state of tranquility and wisdom Epictetus is aiming at is analogous to the ultimate knowledge of Socrates whom he mentions so often and with such respect.  Both are ideals to go towards which will not be reached but are nevertheless what people should try to reach.

1.4     τηλικούτων ‘such great things’; more usual use of τηλίκος is ‘of such an age, so old, so young’, but applied to things, ‘so great’.

1.4     ἐφιέμενος ‘aiming at’, pres. m/p part. ἐφίημι.

1.4     Cf. translation of Oldfather³, ‘…remember that you must bestir yourself with no slight effort to lay hold of them….’, taking the negation with μετρίως; this translation takes it with ἅπτεσθαι, ‘…remember that, if you have aroused yourself moderately, it is necessary not to seize those things….’  taking into consideration the apparent meaning of the following sentences.

1.4     ὑπερτίθεσθαι ‘put off, defer’ (LSJ II.5)

1.4     τὸ παρόν ‘the present’, neuter present participle of πάρειμι (εἰμί sum).

1.4     construction see note 1.3.2.

1.4     τυχόν ‘perchance,  perhaps’, 2^nd aor. neut. part. of τυγχάνω.

1.4     αὐτῶν τούτων i.e. to be powerful and wealthy.

1.4     τῶν προτέρων i.e. the ταῦτα of 1.4.4 whose antecedent is the general idea represented by τηλικούτων of 1.4.1

1.4     ἐκείνων antecedent is προτέρων ‘those great things’.  The general structure is: if you want those great things, but you also want power and money perhaps you won’t get power and money because you are aiming for those great things and you will also lose the great things.

1.4     The idea here is also Socratic.  In the Phaedrus 229a-230a Socrates and Phaedrus are walking outside Athens along the River Ilissus when Phaedrus asks if they are not in the very spot where Boreas was said in a myth to have carried away Orithuia.  He asks Socrates if he really believes that that legend is true.  Socrates gives an account of his attitudes towards religious belief which I recommend to you wholeheartedly. (You will find the entire passage in Appendix I.)  In summary he says, it wouldn’t be unreasonable for me to reject this legend as our intellectuals do, and in fact I could make up a perfectly good rational account.  “But I have no leisure at all for those things, and the reason, my friend, is this.  I have not been able yet, according to the Delphic inscription, to know myself, and it certainly appears laughable to me for one who doesn’t yet know even that, to be looking into other things.  So it is that saying good bye to those things and believing what is customarily thought about them, as I was saying just now, I do not investigate them but rather I investigate myself, if perchance I happen to be some beast more complex than Typho and more furious, or on the other hand a creature more gentle and more simple partaking by nature in something divine and in a quiet share of life.” (229e-230a).  (ἐμοὶ δὲ πρὸς αὐτὰ οὐδαμῶς ἐστι σχολή: τὸ δὲ αἴτιον, ὦ φίλε, τούτου τόδε. οὐ δύναμαί πω κατὰ τὸ Δελφικὸν γράμμα γνῶναι ἐμαυτόν, γελοῖον δή μοι φαίνεται τοῦτο ἔτι ἀγνοοῦντα τὰ ἀλλότρια σκοπεῖν. ὅθεν δὴ χαίρειν ἐάσας ταῦτα, πειθόμενος δὲ τῷ νομιζομένῳ περὶ αὐτῶν, ὃ νυνδὴ ἔλεγον, σκοπῶ οὐ ταῦτα ἀλλ' ἐμαυτόν, εἴτε τι θηρίον ὂν τυγχάνω Τυφῶνος πολυπλοκώτερον καὶ μᾶλλον ἐπιτεθυμμένον, εἴτε ἡμερώτερόν τε καὶ ἁπλούστερον ζῷον, θείας τινὸς καὶ ἀτύφου μοίρας φύσει μετέχον.) 

There is just not enough time so make your choices carefully.

1.5     φαντασία ‘impression’, the common meaning in Epictetus; ‘an external impression, an appearance’.

1.5     μελέτα ‘practice’, imperative of μελετάω ‘take care for, attend to, study’.

1.5   φαινόμενον ‘a manifest thing’, something manifestly so; Epictetus uses φαντασία for what is imagined and φαινόμενον for what is.  Simplicius   (see Appendix III) indicates that φαντασία is an impression and φαινόμενον the object of the impression.  Αἱ δὲ φαντασίαι ποτὲ μὲν ἀληθῶν εἰσιν ἀνατυπωτικαὶ καὶ ἀληθῶς ἐπωφελῶν ἢ ἡδέων, ποτὲ δὲ διακενῆς ὀνειροπολοῦσιν.  ‘Impressions sometimes represent things that are true and things that are truly helpful or pleasant, and sometimes they represent empty dreams.’⁴   A φαντασία may be inaccurate in regard to its φαινόμενον. 

1.5     ἐξέταζε καὶ δοκίμαζε ‘examine and test’ ἐξέταζε ‘examine, review, prove, test’, δοκίμαζε ‘examine, examine and approve’ or simply ‘approve’.

1.5     κανόσι ‘precepts’.

1.5     διότι ‘that’ LSJ: διότι = διὰ τοῦτο ὅτι for this (reason) that.

1.5     Saying, “This is nothing to me,” about a blinding toothache is ridiculous.  Yet the general drift of this first chapter is towards a practical philosophy of life.  Try to discern what you can do something about and work on that, leaving aside those things that are beyond you and would, if you tried to attack them, take your energy away from the good you actually can accomplish. 

There is a tremendous body of Stoic thought whose hulking shadow is glimpsed in our surprisingly limited primary and boundless secondary sources.  It’s evident, too, that Plato’s Socrates is heroic in Epictetus’ eyes and the Enchiridion was Platonic enough for the neo-Platonist, Simplicius, to write a commentary on it as a text for his students.  There is no end to the acquisition of background knowledge for the understanding of Epictetus.  Instead of worrying about that we should go directly to the text with what information each of us has.  Epictetus was a teacher who made his living in his school room in the provincial Roman town of Necopolis teaching mainly young people whose main qualifications were, just as ours are, being human and wondering how we should live.  It was their task and is ours to listen while we choose to be with this teacher and to see what we think and to think for ourselves.

                                                     Chapter 2

2.1     ἐπιτυχία ‘good luck, success’ (LSJ) i.e. the ‘attainment’ of what you desire.

2.1  ἀτυχής and δυστυχής both meaning ‘unfortunate’, ‘luckless’ and ‘having bad luck’.

2.1     ἄν=ἐάν, ἐάν + subjunctive / future indicative, future more vivid condition; so also the following sentence.

2.1     παρὰ φύσιν ‘contrary to nature’ carries a negative and κατὰ φύσιν ‘according to nature’ a positive connotation.  Those things in nature which cause suffering, such as illnesses, are considered deviations from the norms of nature and are therefore παρὰ φύσιν.

2.2     ἆρον ‘remove’ aor. imp. αἴρω

2.2 τῶν ‘of the ones’, ‘take away desire from all things of the ones not under our control and put it among those contrary to nature of the ones under our control’.

2.3     ἄνελε ‘take away’ aor. imp. αἱρέω

2.2 ὀρέγῃ ‘if you desire’.

2.2     ἀτυχεῖν ἀνάγκη sc. ἔσται ‘there will be the necessity to fail’.

2.2     sc. καὶ ἂν ὀρεγῃ τινός ‘and if you desire something of those things under our control; and with ἄν sc. ᾖ ‘may be’.

2.2     χρῶ ‘use’ with dative, imperative of  χράομαι.

2.2     ὑπεξαιρέσεως ‘reservation, reserve’.

                                                     Chapter 3

3.        Epicurus’ meaning in this chapter seems to be that one can work towards equanimity in the face of great losses by beginning to cultivate it in small things.

3. ψυχαγωγούντων ‘interesting’, ψυχαγωγέω ‘lead departed souls to the nether world (of Hermes); attract the souls of the living, win over, persuade, allure’ (L&S).

3.        ἐπιλέγειν ‘say in connection with something’ (LSJ).

3.        χύτραν ‘an earthen pot, jug’ ἡ χύτρα > χέω ‘pour’.

3.        ἂν χύτραν ‘if you should be fond of a jug’ future more vivid condition with omission of fut. indic. or imperative verb (sc. ἐπιλέγειν) in the apodosis.

3.        κατεαγείσης ‘broken’ > κατάγνυμι  ‘break’ 2^nd aor. pass. κατεάγην.

3.        ταραχθήσῃ ‘you will be disturbed’ ταράσσω ‘stir up’ fut. pass. 2^nd per. sing. from aor. pass. εταράχθην.

3.        ἀποθανόντος ‘having died’ one word gen. absolute, antecedent ἄνθρωπον.

                                                      Chapter 4

4.        Knowing what to expect helps a person preserve equanimity.

4.        Ὅταν ‘whenever’, ὅτι + ἄν;  temporal clause referring to indefinite time, taking  ἄν + subj.

4.        ἐὰν λουσόμενος ἀπίῃς ‘if you should go out to bathe’ λουσόμενος fut. mid. part. expressing purpose

4.        πρόβαλλε ‘throw before, propose a problem’ (L&S) here ‘consider, review’.

4.        ἀπορραίνοντας  ‘splashing, spurting’ > ῥαίνω ‘sprinkle’.

4.        ἐγκρουομένους ‘knocking about’ > κρούω ‘strike, clap’.

4.        λοιδοροῦντας ‘handing out abuse’ λοιδορέω ‘abuse, revile, rail at’.

4.        προαίρεσιν ‘choice’ used as a philosophical term by Aristotle meaning choice or decision, and in Stoic philosophy as the term for moral choice good or bad.  One’s use of προαίρεσις , the rational exercise of moral choice for which one is fully responsible, results over time in the formation and development of one’s own character.

4.        Something prevents you from bathing.  You don’t get angry because your choices now do not extend to bathing, i.e. bathing is no longer under your control.  You preserve your choice and your equanimity by choosing to do something else.  This would work well in traffic.  You get cut off by an aggressive driver and so miss an important turn.  You are now prevented from arriving on time.  You preserve equanimity and choice by passing over the actions of the aggressive driver and spending your time and energy on picking an alternate route.  This system doesn’t work, however, in more serious situations such as being deprived of life, limb or property by a criminal action.

                                                    

                                                     Chapter 5

5.        ‘Things do not disturb people, but rather opinions about things do.’  This statement is untrue for many cases.  The pain coming from the cancer invading a person’s pelvic plexus does disturb him and his opinion about it can make little or no difference.  The bald extremeness of Epictetus’ statements certainly evokes thought here and often elsewhere.  If something is bothering you and you see you can’t change it, well, your only other option is to see if you can change your attitude towards it.  In some cases that helps.  We are leaving aside here attitude alteration at happy hour and by drugs in general, though alcohol and opium are ancient and honorable therapies (“Oh many a peer of England brews / Livelier liquor than the Muse / And malt does more than Milton can / To justify God’s ways to man.”  Housman in Terence, this is stupid stuff ).

5.        ἂν ἐφαίνετο ‘it would have appeared’, pres. cont. to fact condition with suppressed protasis.

5.        ‘When we are confused or disturbed or grief stricken . . . we should blame our own opinions.’  A person’s opinion about the death of his child is nothing in comparison with the force of the emotion of grief he is experiencing – at first.  For in time grief does subside and the truth of Epictetus statement begins gradually to appear.  Here and elsewhere Epictetus doesn’t specify time.

5.        ἐφ' οἷς ‘when’ but literally ‘in the things or circumstances in which’.

5.        ἠργμένου  perf. m/p part. ἄρχω ‘begin’.

5.        ‘Not blaming someone else or oneself is the part of an educated person.’  Epictetus has chosen the wrong word for this profound statement.  παιδεύω means teach or educate, though there is evidently more to it than that as indicated by Dr. Jaeger’s heavy duty three volume eponymous work.  A person who is educated, a person who is learned may yet be a big blamer, blaming his colleagues or this bank account or his family or his wallpaper or his fate.  Not blaming has nothing to do with education and all to do with wisdom.  A wise person looks out over things and sees that the world and no one in it owe him the slightest thing.  From this vantage point he does not blame other people.  A wise person looks within himself and sees what he can do and what he can’t do and does the very best he can for others and his community and himself.  Doing this as well as he reasonably can he may avoid blaming himself.  To move the sources of your own wellbeing outside yourself and outside your control is what blaming connotes for Epictetus.  This is different from the rational determination and assignment of responsibility and cause which are part of assessing what is under your control and what is not under your control.

                                                     Chapter 6

6.        ἐπαρθῇς ‘you should be pleased’ > ἐπαίρω ‘lift up’, aor. pass. ἐπήρθην, ‘be lifted up, be excited’.  The free standing subjunctive used without ἄν  is mainly hortatory, deliberative, or (as here) prohibitive.  Neg. is μή for all, hence the μηδενὶ.

 6.       pres. cont. to fact condition.

6.        ὅταν λέγῃς ‘when(ever) you say’, ἴσθι, ὅτι . . . ἐπαίρῃ.  ‘know that you are pleased’.  ἐπαίρῃ  is in the subj. because mood remains unchanged in primary sequence in indirect discourse.  (Note: subjunctive, optative and imperative moods point to the future and are therefore taken as primary in all their tenses. Smyth 1858a.)

6.        ἐπάρθητι ‘be pleased’, aor. pass. imperative.

6.        ἐπαρθήσῃ ‘you would be pleased’ yet another independent use of the subjunctive, doubtful assertion (Smyth 1801).

6.        What is the meaning of this chapter?  The example of the horse seems clear.  A person who has a fine horse may be pleased with his possession of the horse but the virtues of the horse are not the virtues of the man.  The horse is among those things, mentioned in 1.1, which are not under our control (σῶμα ‘body’, κτῆσις ‘property’, δόξαι ‘reputation’, ἀρχαὶ ‘ power’). ‘What then is our own?’  The answer of 1.1 is ὑπόληψις ‘judgment’, ὁρμή ‘motivation’, ὄρεξις ‘desire’, ἔκκλισις  ‘aversion’. The answer here in Chapter 6 moves forward a step to the χρῆσις φαντασιῶν ‘use of impressions’ κατὰ φύσιν ‘in accordance with nature’.  It seems that  χρῆσις ‘use’ means the exercise of προαίρεσις ‘choice’ on the basis of judgment, motivation, desire and aversion in handling impressions.  If you can do that well, in accordance with nature, then you have something you can be pleased with.

                                                     Chapter 7

7.        πλῷ > πλόος  cont. πλοῦς  ‘sea voyage’, πλοίου  ship.

7.        καθορμισθέντος ‘having been brought to anchor’.

7.        ὑδρεύσασθαι  ‘to draw water for oneself’ aor. mid. inf. expressing purpose.

7.        ὁδοῦ μὲν πάρεργον ‘as a diversion of the way’, πάρεργον  being taken in apposition with κοχλίδιον and βολβάριον.

7.        κοχλίδιον  ‘small shell’ > κόχλος  ‘shellfish with spiral shell, conch, murex for dyeing ‘. (LSJ)  Another diminutive of κόχλος, κοχλίον, gives us cochlea.

7.        βολβάριον ‘small flower’ dim. of βολβός ‘bulb’ and identified in LSJ as ‘purse tassels, muscari comosum’, apparently our grape hyacinth.

7.        δεῖ  ‘it is necessary’ the verb of the apodosis is expected to be in the optative.  The sequence of moods here is optative ἐξέλθοις , subjunctive ἀναλέξῃ, and indicative δεῖ . This makes an unusual structure.  “Greek possesses a great variety of ways to join protasis and apodosis….  In the case of some of the less usual types the exact shade of difference cannot be accurately known to us….”  Smyth 2290.  See also Smyth 2300.

7.        τετάσθαι ‘stretch’ perf. m/p infinitive of τείνω.

7.        μή ποτε ὁ κυβερνήτης καλέσῃ ‘lest at some point the captain should call’;  construction is that of an object clause after a verb of effort or caution (Smyth 2220).

7.        ἀφιέναι ‘drop, let go of’ pres. inf. ἀφίημι.

7.        ἵνα μὴ δεδεμένος ἐμβληθῇς ‘in order that you may not be tied up and thrown on board’, final clause with subj. in primary sequence.

7.        γυναικάριον ‘young wife’ dim. of γυνή (LSJ).

7.        οὐδὲν κωλύσει ‘that will be all right’, lit. ‘nothing will hinder’ or ‘it will hinder or prevent nothing’.  L&S:  ‘so be it’, a form of assent.

7.        ἀφεὶς  ‘having dropped’ 2^nd aor. part. ἀφίημι.

7.        μηδὲ ἐπιστρεφόμενος ‘not turning back’, μή rather than οὐ both because the leading verb is imperative and because the sentence is conditional.

7.        The sea is the home of the soul before birth and after death. The ship conveys the soul to the shores of life.  The captain is god or nature or fate.  In life, i.e. on shore, a person may enjoy what is there but, if he is a true philosopher, he keeps alert for the call of the captain to return to the ship, knowing that death may supervene at any moment.  If you are not a true philosopher, if you do not know how to die well, you will be tied up and thrown on board the ship like a sheep.  If you are old and death is near you should remain close to the ship waiting for the captain to call.

This is good Stoic philosophy but at its center a most un-Stoic note of sadness, of longing for the beauties of this world and for human love, is sounded in the four diminutives, κοχλίδιον, βολβάριον,  γυναικάριον and παιδίον ,  that evoke two tender images of life in this world, a person walking on the seashore picking up small shells and little flowers, and a man who has been given a young wife and a little child.  It is really beyond human ability and all reason to ask a person to “drop all these things and not turn back” when the κυβερνήτης  calls. The imagery of  Epictetus’ language gets the better of the dogma he’s working with and gives his own philosophy meaning and force.                                   

                                                       

                                                    

                                                   Chapter 8

8.        εὐροήσεις ‘flow well, speak fluently,  get on well, be prosperous’, (L&S).

8.        Lit. ‘wish the things that are <to be> as they are’.

8.        Can you imagine what your life would be like if you took this statement seriously?

                                                     Chapter 9

9.        αὐτὴ does this refer back to  προαιρέσεως or to νόσος  (which is also feminine)?  Undoubtedly to προαιρέσεως  because of position but it immediately comes to mind that disease of the body seldom fails to affect the mind.  You can be preoccupied with a hang nail.

9.        χώλανσις  ‘lameness’ (LSJ) > χωλός , ‘lame’.

9.        This takes it for granted that the self is 100% νοῦς.

                                                     Chapter 10

10.     χρῆσιν ‘use, management’.

10.     καλὸν  ‘beautiful’ sc. male person and similarly female person for καλήν.

10.   ἐγκράτειαν ‘self-control’ and καρτερίαν ‘patient endurance’, both words from κράτος ‘strength’.

                                                     Chapter 11

11.     The glaring illogicality of this chapter on close reading clears, on taking a step back, into another comment by Epictetus on the uselessness of blaming (cf. Chapter 5).  You may think god is wicked to take away your child and your wife.  You know a wicked man has taken your property.  Spend your time and effort on doing your best to care for whatever happens to belong to you for the time being.

11.     ἀφῃρέθην ‘has been taken away’ > αἱρέω ‘take’.

11.     ἀφελόμενος ‘having taken for himself’, 2^nd aor. mid. part. of αἱρεω from εἷλον.

11.     ἀπῄτησε ‘demanded back’, > αἰτέω aor. ᾖτησα.

11.     μέχρι ‘while’ the subj. with ἄν after μέχρι denotes future or repeated action.

11.     ἐπιμελοῦ ‘take care of’.  There are two forms of this verb, ἐπιμέλομαι and ἐπιμελέομαι apparently meaning the same thing and the imperative of the latter carries a circumflex.  Lit. ‘while he may give, take care of it as though belonging to another, as passersby (travelers) do an inn (πανδοχείου, an all receiver).

                                                    

                                                     Chapter 12

12.1   construction, see 1.3

12.1   ἀφθόνοις ‘in plenty’.  Basic meaning is ‘without envy, ungrudging’ and secondarily, ‘not grudging or stinting, abundant, plentiful’.

12.1   τὸν παῖδα may mean ‘son’ or as here ‘slave’.

12.1   ἄρξαι ‘begin’ aor. mid. imperative.

12.2   ἐλάδιον ‘a little oil’ (LSJ).

12.2   οἰνάριον ‘weak, bad wine; a little wine’ (LSJ).

12.2   τοσούτου ‘for such a price’ genitive of price (Smyth 1372).  Lit. ‘for such a price freedom from emotion is sold, for such a price tranquility’.

12.2   προῖκα ‘free, gratis’, > προἰξ, προικός, ἡ ‘gift’; Attic acc. προῖκα as adverb.

12.2   ὅταν  construction, see 4.1.

12.2   ἐπ' ἐκείνῳ ‘under his control’ see 1.1.1.

                                                     Chapter 13

13.     ὑπόμεινον ‘endure’, with the participle δόξας ‘endure, in regard to external things, seeming mindless and silly’.

13.     ἴσθι ‘know’ this second person singular imperative of οἶδα is spelled and accented exactly like the imp. of εἰμί sum.

13.     The thought is similar to that of 1.4.

                                                     Chapter 14

14.1   Present general conditions.

14.1   μὴ ἁμαρτάνειν instead of ού ἁμαρτάνειν because of the expectantly conditional sense of the main verb as also for μὴ εἶναι in 14.1.6 and μὴ ἀποτυγχάνειν in 14.1.7 (Smyth1991).

14.1   ἐὰν δὲ θέλῃς . . . Lit. ‘If you should wish, <desiring something>, not to fail to obtain <it>, this you are able <to do>’.  Epictetus has just said if you want people to live forever you are a fool and if you want your slave not to make mistakes you are a moron.  Now he says if you want something you can have it.  As usual the paradox marks an important thought.  There is a change of emphasis from if you want to if you want, and he explains this in what immediately follows.

14.2   ἐξουσίαν ‘power, authority’; this noun uses a genitive of what there is power over.  The construction is, ‘the master is the one having authority of the things wished and not wished, to give and to take away’.

14.2   ἀφελέσθαι  'take away, remove' > ἀφαιρέω.

14.2   μήτε θελέτω τι μήτε φευγέτω τι τῶν ἐπ' ἄλλοις ‘he must not want anything or avoid anything under the control of others’.  The plain language meaning of this is again paradoxical.  Not to desire what is under the control of others is, perhaps, understandable even if not humanly doable.  Not to avoid anything under the control of others, let’s say a freight train, is an entirely different matter.

                                                     Chapter 15

15.   ἀναστρέφεσθαι ‘conduct yourself’.  Life is represented by a symposium, a drinking-together-party, a dinner party.  Cf. the lines of Lucretius, De Rerum Natura, Book III, line 938-9:                                                   

Cur  non ut plenus vitae conviva recedis                                                              aequo animoque capis securam, stulte, quietem?                                                  

Why do you not retire like a guest full of the banquet of life, and with a calm mind take, you fool, a repose free of care?                                           

15.     περιφερόμενον γέγονέ τι  ‘something has been passed around’.  The meaning is straightforward but the periphrastic construction with γίγνομαι  is unusual.

15.     construction see 11.

15.     ὑπερίδῃς ‘you should overlook, ignore, disregard’ > ὑπεροράω.

15.     The thought is a common one and is also Socratic. Cf. “The fewer possessions I have the closer I am to the gods.” Attributed to Socrates in Diogenes Laertius Lives Book II, Chapter 27.

                                                     Chapter 16

16.     πρόσεχε ‘take heed’, followed by an object clause with the subjunctive (Smyth 2220).  Lit. ‘take heed lest the image seize you, as of him being in troubles, the external <ones>’.

16.     τὸ συμβεβηκός  ‘ what has happened’ > συμβαίνω.

16.     μέχρι ‘as far as’ here serving as a preposition with the genitive;  this phrase must mean ‘as far as it is reasonable however’.

16.     συνεπιστενάξαι  ‘groan along with’.  The good Stoic may pretend to share in human grief, letting his hair down and groaning along with the weak ninny who has lost his child or his possessions.  πρόσεχε μέντοι μὴ καὶ ἔσωθεν στενάξῃς ‘take care however that you do not groan inwardly’.

                                                    

                                                     Chapter 17

17.     ὑποκριτὴς  ‘actor’.  In Attic an interpreter or expounder or one who plays a part on the stage; in later Greek including NT, a pretender, dissembler, hypocrite.

17.     διδάσκαλος  ‘teacher’.  A dramatic poet was called a διδάσκαλος because he taught the actors their parts and directed them in his play;  we might say ‘director’.

17.     ἂν βραχύ, βραχέος, ἂν μακρόν, μακροῦ  The genitives βραχέος and μακροῦ can be taken in apposition with δράματος and the accusatives βραχύ and μακρόν as objects of the understood phrase ἂν θέλῃ ‘a drama, short if he wants it short, etc.’.

17.     ἵνα  ‘see that’, a word such as ὅρα or βλέπε being understood, with the subjunctive (L&S,B,II,2).

17.     ἂν with each sc. θέλῃ.

17.     ἰδιώτην  can mean either ‘private person’ or ‘ignoramus’.

17.     πρόσωπον  The basic meaning is face, countenance ( from πρὀς and ὤψ ‘the eye’) and it also may mean mask, bust or portrait, person.

                                                     Chapter 18

18.     κεκράγῃ  ‘croaks’ > κράζω, non-periphrastic perfect subjunctive said to be very rare (Smyth 692).

18.     ἀλλ' ἢ  ‘but rather’.

18.     σωματίῳ  ‘poor body’, dim of σῶμα, and similarly for κτησειδίῳ ‘poor possessions’ and δοξαρίῳ ‘poor reputation’.

18.     ὅ τι γὰρ ἂν τούτων ἀποβαίνῃ  ‘for whatever may come from these things’, conditional relative clause (Smyth 2560).

                                                     Chapter 19

19.2      ὅρα  ‘see to it’. subjunctive with verb of caution, neg. μή (Smyth 2220b).

19.2   μέγα ‘greatly’, adverbial or accusative of respect.

19.2   ‘For if the existence of the good is in those things that are under our control, then neither envy nor jealousy has a place with us.’  Envy and jealousy have to do with what we do not have under our control and since the existence of the good is in what is under our control we must attend to that only, so that envy and jealousy will never trouble us.

19.2    μία δὲ ὁδὸς  . . . ‘the one road to freedom is contempt for what is not under our control’.

                                                     Chapter 20

20.     ἐρεθίσῃ  ‘may anger’ aor. subj. ἐριθίζω.

20.     πειρῶ  ‘try’, imperative.

20.   χρόνου καὶ διατριβῆς  ‘time and spending time’.  This is the first occasion on which Epictetus explicitly factors in time, acknowledging in doing so that one’s initial response to being insulted or beaten may not be the desirable glacial tranquility of the accomplished Stoic.

                                                    

Chapter 21

21.     ἔστω ‘let them be’, the 3^rd person singular rather than plural because the last part of the compound subject is neuter plural.

21.     οὐδὲν οὐδέποτε οὔτε . . . οὔτε . . . :  for accumulation of negatives see Smyth 2760-62.

                                                     Chapter 22

22.     ὡς  ‘in the belief that’; for meaning of ὡς  with participles of cause or purpose see Smyth 2086.

22.     ὀφρύς ‘brow’, a good example of synecdoche, the part for the whole (Smyth 3047).

22.     μὴ σχῇς ‘you should not have’, μὴ  with aorist subjunctive without ἄν, prohibitive subjunctive (see note to 6.1 and Smyth 1800).

22.     οὕτως ἔχου, ‘be so disposed’.  ἔχω used with adverbs of manner meaning simply ‘to be’ as in εὖ ἔχει, καλῶς ἔχει, κακῶς ἔχει.

22.     διπλοῦν ‘double’ contract adjective (Smyth 290).         

22.     καταγέλωτα ‘ridicule’ κατάγελως –ωτος, ὁ  (for accented antepenult with long ultima see Smyth 163a).

                                                     Chapter 23

23.     ἔνστασιν ‘plan of life’. ἔνστασις –εως ἡ.

23.     ἀρκοῦ ‘be content’ with dative, > ἀρκέω ‘ward off, be strong enough, suffice’; ἀρκεῖ ‘it is enough, it suffices’ impersonal; in passive ‘to be satisfied with’.

                                                     Chapter 24

24.1      θλιβέτωσαν ‘let them distress’, present imperative 3^rd person plural; the expected form in Attic would be θιλβόντων; -ετωσαν is used in later prose (Smyth 466.3).

24.1   οὐ μᾶλλον ἢ ἐν αἰσχρῷ ‘no more than in baseness’, lit. ‘no more than <you are able to be> in a base state <because of another>’.

24.1   ἑστίασιν ‘to a banquet’ > ἑστιάω ‘receive at one’s hearth or in one’s house, entertain, feast’ > ἑστία ‘hearth’.

24.1   ‘How will you be nobody nowhere when you must be someone in those matters alone which are under your control and in which it is possible for you to be worthy of the greatest honor?’

24.2   κερμάτιον ‘a mite, a cent, a farthing’ dim. of  κέρμα ‘a slice, a small coin, a mite’ > κείρω ‘clip, trim’.  Epictetus is thinking of the life of a philosopher like Socrates who has no material wealth to pass out to friends and below (in 24.3) he takes a severe line against any getting of material things.  This is Socratic but not at all in line with the Stoicism of one of our major primary sources of Stoic thought, Seneca.

24.2   κτῆσαι ‘acquire’ aor. imp. of κτάομαι.

24.3   ἀξιοῦτε ‘deem worthy, expect’ with acc. and infinitive. Lit. ‘if you expect me to lose the good things, those of myself, in order that you might acquire for yourselves things not good . . . . ’

24.3   αὐτὰ ταῦτα ‘these very things’, i.e. τὰ ἀγαθὰ τὰ ἐμαυτοῦ.

24.4   ὅσον ‘as far as’, adverbial.

24.4   αὐτῇ ‘her’ the city.

24.4   εἰ κατεσκεύαζες / ἂν ὠφέλεις ‘if you provided / would you help’ present contrary to fact condition, εί + imperfect / imperfect + ἄν; ὠφέλεις imperfect, ὠφελεῖς  is present.

24.4   ἂν εἴης ‘you would be’ a “potential” clause (see helpful notes in Morwood p. 219) i.e. the apodosis of a future less vivid condition with a suppressed protasis.

24.4   ἣν ἂν δύνῃ ‘whatever you may be able’, conditional relative clause, more vivid construction (Smyth 2560).

24.5   ἀποβαλεῖς ‘you will throw away’; this construction, εἰ + fut. indicative / aor. optative + ἄν, is atypical but the meaning is perfectly clear.  If it were demanded, you could resolve this sentence into two potential clauses (see 24.4.9):  if you will throw away / <then you will end up worthless> (future most vivid) and <if you should end up worthless> / how would you be helpful to her? (future less vivid).

                                                     Chapter 25

25.1   μέμνησο . . . .  Lit. ‘Remember that you are not able, not doing these very same things <as the person who gets the invitations> for the purpose of obtaining things <invitations, etc., which are in any case> not under our control, <you are not able, I say> to be deemed worthy of equal things <equal to the rewards of the one who does do those very same things that the person invited to dinner does>’.  The meaning of this difficult sentence is clarified by Epictetus in what follows.

25.2   τῷ φοιτῶντι take with ἴσον ‘how is it possible for the person who does not resort to the doors of some (patron) to have an equal share with the one who does resort?’  The same construction is carried into the following two questions.

25.2   ἄπληστος ‘not to be filled, insatiate’ > πίμπλημι ‘fill’.

25.2   προϊέμενος ‘paying’, > προΐημι, ‘pay’ in middle (LSJ B II 3 c).

25.2   ταῦτα ‘those things, that amount’.

25.3   πόσου ‘for how much’ gen. of price (Smyth 1372).

25.3   θρίδακες ‘lettuces’; we do have a word from this in the OED, thridace, “the inspissated juice of lettuce, used as a sedative”.  Epictetus turns dinner invitations, important titles, and advisory committees into so much lettuce – if you like that sort of thing you pay your obol and you get your lettuce, but don’t expect free lettuce.  If you don’t want any lettuce you don’t have to spend your obol.  Epictetus does not care for lettuce, and leaves no doubt about it in the next paragraph.

25.3   ἂν οὕτω τύχῃ ‘should it so chance, perhaps’; potential clause, present general construction, ἐάν + subjunctive.

25.3   οἴου ‘think’ imperative of οἴομαι.

25.4   τὸν αὐτὸν δὴ τρόπον καὶ ἐνταῦθα ‘it’s the same way here’;  both τρόπον and ἐνταῦθα have a wide range of meanings.  Why the freestanding accusative?  Adverbial accusative of manner (Smyth 1608) or as L&S says, accusative used absolutely.

25.4   ὅσου  gen. of price again, and so for ἐπαίνου and θεραπείας;  in the previous clause sc. ‘the price’;  lit. ‘for you did not give to the inviter <the price> of so much as he sells his dinner’.

25.4   διάφορον ‘difference, balance due’.

25.4    προϊέσθαι ‘pay for’, see note 25.2.5.

25.5   ἀνασχέσθαι ‘endure, put up with’ with the genitive.

                                                     Chapter 26

26.     οἷον, ὅταν ‘as when’ or ‘as for example, when’; the οἷον goes with λέγειν, ‘as for example . . . to say’.

26.     κατεαγῇ ‘may break, breaks’ aorist subj > κατάγνυμι ‘break in pieces’, κατάξω, κατέαξα, aor. pass.  κατεάγην.

26.     τῶν γινομένων ἐστίν ‘it is of the things that are, it is one of those things’.  Partitive gen. or as helpfully termed by Smyth (1306) the gen of the divided whole.

26.     κατεαγῇ ‘may be broken’ aor. pass subjunctive after ὅταν.

26.     κατεάγη ‘is broken’ aor. pass. indicative after ὅτε.

26.     μετατίθει ‘apply’ imperative.

26.     τὸ <τέκνον >αὐτοῦ τινος ‘the child of someone himself’.

26.     ἐχρῆν ‘it was necessary’, for form see Smyth 438b.

                                                     Chapter 27

27.     Ὥσπερ σκοπὸς πρὸς τὸ ἀποτυχεῖν οὐ τίθεται, οὕτως οὐδὲ κακοῦ φύσις ἐν κόσμῳ γίνεται.  ‘Just as a target is not set up to be missed, so also there is no nature of the bad in the universe’.  These two lines making up the entirety of Chapter XXVII of the Enchiridion evoke 540 lines of commentary in Simplicius.⁵   I have summarized what he says in Appendix II.

27.     κόσμῳ ‘the universe’, a word meaning order, good order, decoration in Homer and afterwards but also used first by Pythagoras and then throughout the history of philosophy to mean world-order or universe. 

                                                     Chapter 28

28.     Εἰ ἐπέτρεπε / ἠγανάκτεις ἄν ‘if he turned over / you would be vexed’, present contrary to fact condition.

28.     τῷ ‘to someone’, alternate form of τίνι or (as here) τινί (Smyth 334).  So also in 28.3.

28.     ὅτι ‘that’, in apposition with τούτου of 28.5.

28.   ἵνα ‘with the result that’.  There is no clear indication of this usage in LSJ or Smyth but it is well discussed in Bauer, esp. in section 3.

                                                     Chapter 29

29.1   τὴν μὲν πρώτην ‘at first’, adverbial, with πρώτην sc. ὣραν, ὁδόν.

29.2   δεῖ ‘it is necessary’, governs infinitives throughout this long sentence.

29.2   ἀναγκοτροφεῖν ‘eat according to a prescribed regimen’ (LSJ).

29.2   πεμμάτων ‘pastry, cakes’, > πέσσω  ‘soften, ripen, cook, bake’.

29.2   ὡς ἔτυχεν ‘whenever you please’ (L&S B.3).

29.2   παρορύσσεσθαι ‘dig against or beside another’ παροπύσσω (LSJ).  Was there a ditch-digging event at the Olympics?

29.2   ἔστι δὲ ὅτε  ‘there are times when, sometimes, now and then’ (L&S).  For non-enclitic ἔστι see Smyth 187.

29.2   καταπιεῖν ‘drink down’, we might say, ‘eat’, > πίνω.

29.3   ἀναστραφήσῃ ‘you will be turned back’, future passive from aorist passive stem of στρέφω.

29.3   θέαν ‘sight’. θέα ‘sight’, θεά ‘goddess’.

29.3   μιμῇ ‘you mimic’, μιμέομαι.

29.3   ἄλλο ἐξ ἄλλου ‘one thing at one time, another thing at another time’, sc. χρόνου with ἄλλου.

29.3   εἰκῇ ‘without a plan’, adverb.

29.4   Εὐφράτης  ‘Euphrates’ a Stoic philosopher, contemporary of  Epictetus who was known for his oratory.

29.5   ἐπίσκεψαι ‘look, consider’, middle imperative.

29.5   ὁποῖόν ἐστι ‘what sort of thing it is’ and εἰ δύνασαι, ‘whether you are able’, indirect questions with indicative in primary sequence.

29.5   πένταθλος ‘pentathlete’, who does long-jump, running, discus, javelin and wrestling.

29.5   ὀσφὺν ‘loins’.  What part of the body is this?  There is an excellent article in the OED.  The loins or loin is the back from the lowest rib to the brim of the pelvis.  But there is also the vague biblical and poetical usage in ‘gird up your loins’ and ‘the fruit of his loins’ for which we do not wish to have a precise definition.

29.6   ἄλλος γὰρ πρὸς ἄλλο πέφυκε  ‘For one person is naturally good at one thing and another at another’. φύω in the perfect is intransitive and means grow, arise, be born, be, be by nature.

29.6   πραγματίῳ ‘little thing, trifling matter’, the diminutive here at the end of the list giving a tone of exasperation.

29.7   ἀντικαταλλάξασθαι  ‘receive in exchange’, you receive an accusative in exchange for a genitive.

29.7   μὴ ὡς τὰ παιδία ‘lest like the children’, those children in 29.3.3 who play at being first one person, then another.  In this sentence sc. subjunctive such as ᾖς

29.7   ἢ τὸ ἡγεμονικόν σε δεῖ ἐξεργάζεσθαι τὸ σαυτοῦ ἢ τὸ ἐκτὸς ‘It is necessary for you to attend to either the management, that of yourself, or that of external things’.

29.7   You must be either a philosopher or a layman.  Another of Epictetus’ extreme formulations.

                                                     Chapter 30

30.     Τὰ καθήκοντα ‘proper or fitting things’ > καθήκω.

30.     ὡς ἐπίπαν ‘on the whole, in general’.

30.     ταῖς σχέσεσι ‘the context’ > σχέσις  ‘state, condition’.

30.     ὑπαγορεύεται ‘it is suggested’.

30.     ᾠκειώθης ‘you have been united’.

30.     τοιγαροῦν ‘so therefore’.

30.     τί ‘what result’.

30.   ἔσῃ βεβλαμμένος ‘you will have been hurt’, periphrastic future perfect (Smyth 583).

                                                     Chapter 31

31.1   Τῆς περὶ τοὺς θεοὺς εὐσεβείας ‘of reverence towards the gods’, partitive genitive (Smyth 1306).

31.1   κατατεταχέναι ‘to have appointed’, perf. active infinitive κατατάσσω.

31.1   μέμψῃ ‘you will blame’, picking up again the topic of Chapter 5.  If you simply accept it that the gods are managing the cosmos nobly and justly, if you turn yourself into a Dr. Pangloss, you’ll get on just fine.  That this sort of theodicy is unbelievable is not lost on Epictetus as indicated in the following sections of Chapter 31.  In section 2 the student of Stoicism is told that he will indeed blame other people and the gods unless he disregards any good or bad thing which is not under his control.  The practical application of this advice is difficult to visualize.  The ideal is indifference to what one cannot control, but Epictetus comes very close to a flat contradiction when he says that πέφυκε γὰρ πρὸς τοῦτο πᾶν ζῷον τὰ μὲν βλαβερὰ φαινόμενα καὶ τὰ αἴτια αὐτῶν φεύγειν καὶ ἐκτρέπεσθαι, τὰ δὲ ὠφέλιμα καὶ τὰ αἴτια αὐτῶν μετιέναι τε καὶ τεθηπέναι. ‘It is natural in this regard for every living thing to flee and turn away from those things that are clearly harmful along with the causes of them, but to admire and pursue those things which are beneficial and their causes.’  πέφυκε ‘it is natural’, it is presumably κατὰ φύσιν.  Epictetus concludes this section, ἀμήχανον οὖν βλάπτεσθαί τινα οἰόμενον χαίρειν τῷ δοκοῦντι βλάπτειν, ὥσπερ καὶ τὸ αὐτῇ τῇ βλάβῃ χαίρειν ἀδύνατον ‘Indeed it is impossible (ἀμήχανον and ἀδύνατον) for someone perceiving that he is harmed to rejoice in the thing that is seen to be harming him, just as it is impossible to rejoice in the harm itself.’  He then adds that this failure of indifference towards what is not under our control causes sons to revile fathers, brothers to kill each other, farmers, sailors and merchants and those who have lost their wives and children to revile the gods.  Having gotten out on this weak limb of theodicy using such vivid examples, Epictetus states that ‘Where there is benefit there is also piety’, by which he seems to mean that suffering is due to a lack of indifference to what is not under our control and results in blaming the gods, while what is under our control is beneficial and obtaining benefits results in piety.  He ends this chapter with advice about how to honor the gods, having begun it with an exhortation to reverence for them.

31.2   ἐκείνων sc. τῶν οὐκ ἐφ’ἡμίν.

31.3   τεθηπέναι ‘to admire’ > τέθεπα  perfect with present sense, ‘be astonished’.

31.4   διὰ τοῦτο ‘on account of this’ i.e. on account of the failure to lift the good and the bad out from among those things which are not under our control and put them among those which are under our control alone.

31.4   συμφέρον   ‘advantage, profit, benefit’.  I profit so I’m pious.  I’m pious so I profit.  The credo of well off people through the ages.

31.5   ἀπάρχεσθαι ‘conduct sacrifices’, to make a beginning of the sacrifice by cutting off some hair from the head of the animal and throwing it into the fire.

31.5   ἐπισεσυρμένως  ‘in a slovenly manner’.

                                                     Chapter 32

32.1   μαντικῇ ‘seer’s prophecy’, > ἡ μαντικὴ τεχνή.

32.1   πευσόμενος ‘in order to learn’, > πυνθόνομαι future πεύσομαι.  ὡς with future participle expressing purpose.

32.2 ἔσται ‘it will be possible’.

32.2   αὐτῷ ‘it’, the thing predicted by the seer, dative object of  χρήσασθαι.

32.2   τοῦτο ‘it’, as above either as acc. object of ‘no one will prevent it’ or as acc. of respect ‘no one will hinder you in respect  to it’.

32.3     This sentence answers two questions that may have come to mind in the previous section, 1) why should a philosopher go to a seer, since any answer he gets, if he is true philosopher, will be a matter of indifference to him, and 2) why not use your own reason to work out the answer?  The answers.  1) Follow the example of Socrates and go to the oracle when the πᾶσα σκέψις ‘the whole inquiry’ has ἀναφορὰν ‘reference’ to the ἔκβασιν ‘outcome’.  This seems to mean, ask the oracle only big important questions in order to obtain general guidance rather than specific questions about things which are matters of indifference to the real philosopher.  2) You should go to the seer only when the means for understanding are not available ἐκ λόγου ‘from reason’ or ἐκ τέχνης τινὸς ἄλλης ‘from any other skill’.

32.3   ἠξίου ‘thought fit’ imperfect of ἀξιόω.

32.3   δεήσῃ ‘you may need’ aor. subj. δέω.

32.3   μαντεύεσθαι with δεήσῃ.

32.3   εἰ συγκινδυνευτέον ‘if it is necessary for a risk to be run’, sc. ἐστί. impersonal use of the verbal adjective or gerundive.

32.3   αἱρεῖ ‘requires’ (L&S, A.II.5).

32.3   καὶ σὺν τούτοις ‘even with these’ risks of death or exile.

32.3   παρίστασθαι ‘to stand by’, pres m/p inf.

32.3   ἀναιρουμένῳ ‘being killed’.

                                                     Chapter 33

33.2   δι' ὀλίγων ‘in a few words’ (L&S) 2.IV.2.)

33.2   περὶ οὐδενὸς τῶν τυχόντων ‘concerning nothing that is trivial (randomly happening)’.

33.2   ἀθλητῶν   ‘combatants’, this and ‘champion’ being the meanings given in LSJ, while ‘prizefighter’ is given in L&S and also the Latin, athleta, -ae (masculine) which is defined in Glare as one who takes part in public games, a wrestler, a prizefighter.

33.2   τῶν ἑκασταχοῦ ‘things that are everywhere’, i.e. ordinary things, things spoken of everywhere.

33.3   μετάγαγε τοῖς σοῖς λόγοις καὶ τοὺς τῶν συνόντων ἐπὶ τὸ προσῆκον Lit. ‘change by means of your own words (dat. of instrument) also the words of your companions to the fitting’.

33.3   ‘If you happen to have gotten stuck among folks from another phylum, keep quiet’. Either ἀποληφθεὶς or its homophone ἀπολειφθεὶς would work well, ‘stuck, held back’ or ‘left behind’.

33.4   ἀνειμένος ‘let go free, released, relaxed, remiss, slack, unconstrained, at ease, careless, unstrung’, perf, pass, participle of ἀνίημι.

33.5   ἐκ τῶν ἐνόντων ‘as far as you are able’, see impersonal uses of ἔνειμι in L&S.

33.6   διακρούου ‘avoid’.  Meaning of κρούω is knock, hit, strike;  διακρούω primary meaning in L&S ‘to prove by knocking or ringing, as one does an earthen vessel’; then in middle, ‘knock away from oneself, get rid of, elude’.

33.6   ἐντετάσθω ‘let it be exerted’, perfect m/p 3^rd sing. imperative of ἐντείνω.

33.6   ὑπορρυῇς ‘flow or slip into’.  2^nd aorist passive (with active meaning) subjunctive.  For the ρρ see Smyth 80.

33.6   ᾖ μεμολυσμένος ‘has become vile’;  regular periphrastic m/p subjunctive;  > μολύνω ‘stain, sully’;  this seems to be a strong word in LSJ, ‘defile, debauch παῖδα; become vile, disgrace oneself μετὰ γυναικῶν;  make a beast of; ὥσπερ θηρίον ὕειον ἐν ἀμαθία μολύνεσθαι,  ‘wallow in ignorance like a wild pig’.

33.6   τὸν συνανατριβόμενον ‘the one rubbed up against’.

33.6   συμμολύνεσθαι ‘be vile together with’.

33.8   τὸ ‘this’ object of παράφερε, ‘don’t bring it up everywhere that you yourself do not have sex’.

33.9   ἐπεὶ οὐκ ἂν ταῦτα μόνα ἔλεγεν ‘since he would not have said only those things’;  although the meaning is perfectly clear the structure is a little hard to categorize; Smyth would undoubtedly call this a causal clause with cause expressed by ‘the unreal indicative with ἄν’  (Smyth 2243).

33.10   σπουδάζων ‘acting on behalf of’,  i.e. you are not there to be eager for or to support one actor or contestant or another, but to improve yourself.

33.10   ἔστι  for accent see Smyth 187.b.

33.10   θέλε γίνεσθαι μόνα τὰ γινόμενα  ‘wish to exist only the things that do exist’,  the central message of Stoicism in a nutshell, and often repeated by Epictetus in various forms.

33.10   ἀπέχου  ‘refrain from’;  takes the genitive and also infinitive construction;  here you refrain from laughing (gen. articular infinitive) and from getting excited (infinitive construction); ἐπὶ πολὺ ‘greatly’ (L&S πολύς IV.3.c).

33.10     μετὰ τὸ ἀπαλλαγῆναι  ‘after the show lets out’.

33.10   How can Epictetus tell his students in Chapter 22 not to ‘have a brow’ and then say this?

33.11   τινῶν  ‘any’, indefinite and accented because disyllabic enclitics following a paroxytone keep their accents (Smyth 183.d).

33.11   Adjectives used substantively with and without the article.

33.12   τί ἂν ἐποίησεν ‘what would he have done’, past contrary to fact construction.

33.13   ἐντιναχθήσονταί  ‘will be slammed on’,  > τινάσσω ‘shake, brandish’.

33.13   φροντιεῖ  ‘will give a thought to’; Attic future φροντίζω.

33.14   τὸ  with μεμνῆσθαι.

33.14   Lit. ‘for not, as it is pleasant to you to recall your own dangerous exploits, is it so pleasant also to others to hear of the things that happened to you.’

                                                    

                                                    

                                                    Chapter 34

34.     φύλασσε σαυτόν, μὴ συναρπασθῇς  ‘guard yourself lest you be carried away’;  for construction see note on 16.3.

34.   τὸ προσηνὲς αὐτοῦ καὶ ἡδὺ καὶ ἐπαγωγόν  ‘the softness of it and the sweetness and temptation’, adjectives sued substantively as in 33.11.2.

34.   Lit. ‘but contrast by how much it is better to be conscious of yourself having won this victory’.

                                                     Chapter 35 

35.     ἀλλοῖόν ‘other than good’, euphemism for κακόν τι (L&S).

                                                     Chapter 36

36.   This difficult first sentence can be rendered literally, ‘As the statement “it is day” and the statement “it is night” have meaning for the separated thing but no meaning for the woven together thing, so also choosing the larger portion for the body must have meaning, but (sc. choosing the larger portion) for the (first τό) preserving of the (2^nd τό) common share at a feast, has no meaning’.  What is Epicurus saying?  He tells us in the following sentences about preserving the respect due to the host, and this gives the boiled down thought that what is useful, valuable, meaningful in one context may not be so in another.  Therefore consider the context before you act.

           The terms ‘the separated thing’ and ‘the woven together thing’ are said by Simplicius to describe hypothetical syllogisms, some being disjunctive and some conjunctive, features of Stoic logic⁶ .

                                                     Chapter 38

38.   ἡγεμονικὸν ‘ruling principle, sense of direction, governing principle’.

                                                     Chapter 39

39.   στῇς ‘’if you stand’, subj. of astigmatic aorist of ἵστημι which is intransitive.

39.   λοιπὸν ‘for the rest, finally, in the end’, adverbial.

                                                     Chapter 40

40.   ὁρῶσαι ‘seeing’, pres. participle ὁράω.  The meaning of this chapter is that women are like the shoes of Chapter 39.  Shoes have their purpose and to serve that purpose it is necessary to preserve measure and moderation in making them.  If you go beyond measure you’ll run off the edge of a cliff, which in the case of shoes is gold, purple and embroidery.  Women realizing their only purpose is to marry can go off the edge by putting all their hopes in making themselves beautiful when what is required is an appearance of decency and respectfulness. Talibanesque.

                                                     Chapter 41

41.   This chapter is a very straightforward statement of the mind-body division and hierarchy.

                                                     Chapter 42

42.   ἀκολουθεῖν ‘follow’ in the sense of following an arugment, understanding;  takes the dative.

42.   τῷ σοὶ φαινομένῳ ‘what is apparent to you’.

42.   κακῶς adverbial, therefore ‘badly’ = ‘wrongly’.

42.   συμπεπλεγμένον  ‘compound, complex’, see LSJ for mention of Stoic uses, e.g. ‘περὶ τοῦ πεπλεγμένον on the compound sentence, title of work by Chrysippus’.

                                                     Chapter 43

43.   Simplicius comments (Hadot p.434, 33-37), ‘Even our enemies have two handles and it is possible to be benefited by them for they may put our condition to a very bitter test and make us more sound.  In fact Plutarch of Chaeronea wrote a whole book about benefitting from one’s enemies’⁶.

                                                     Chapter 44

44.   ἀσύνακτοι ‘incompatible, incoherent, illogical’; this passage is cited in LSJ.

44.   λογιώτερος  ‘more learned, more eloquent’, here the latter because of λέξις (44.) ‘speaking, way of speaking, diction’ (L&S).

                                                    

                                                    

                                                     Chapter 45

45.   δόγμα  ‘that which seems to one’, the first definition in LSJ seems to be a good meaning here.

45.   φαντασίας καταληπτικὰς  ‘convincing images’.  Cicero (Academica ii 145) tells a story of how Zeno (the founder of Stoicism) would describe true knowledge when he was teaching in the Stoa Poikile. ‘Et hoc quidem Zeno gestu conficiebat. Nam, cum extensi digitis adversam manum ostenderat, 'visum,' inquiebat, 'huius modi est.' Deinde, cum paulum digitos contraxerat, 'adsensus huius modi.' Tum cum plane compresserat pugnumque fecerat, comprehensionem illam esse dicebat: qua ex similitudine etiam nomen ei rei, quod ante non fuerat, κατάληψιν imposuit. Cumautem laevam manum adverterat et illum pugnum arte vehementerque compresserat, scientiam talem esse dicebat, cuius compotem nisi sapientem esse neminem.  (And Zeno accompanied this with a gesture.  He would hold out his open hand with fingers extended and say ‘the image is of this sort;  then when he had closed his hand entirely and made a fist he would say that that was comprehension and from this example he applied the name κατάληψις which it had not had before;  then when he had taken his left hand and vigorously and tightly grasped his fist he would say that knowledge was like this, and was possessed by no one but the wise man.)  We can retell it using Epictetus’ terminology.  Zeno would hold out his open right hand palm up.  This would be the mind ready to receive a φαντασία (the image of a φαινόμενον, see notes on 1.5.1 and 1.5.3).  He would represent the reception of the φαντασία by cupping his fingers slightly. If the φαντασία were convincing, if it were able to seize the φαινόμενον and so to convey direct apprehension of it, then he would close his hand tightly into a fist holding what was now a φαντασία κατακηπτική, an impression firmly grasping its object.  This did not constitute ἐπιστήμη or knowledge and Zeno would grasp the right fist with his left hand, this representing the application of careful reasoning and rational assessment.

                                                    

                                                     Chapter 46

46.1   ἀλλὰ ποίει τὸ ἀπὸ τῶν θεωρημάτων  ‘but do what <comes> from the precepts’.

46.1   ὥστε ἤρχοντο  ‘with the result that they came’;  consecutive or result clause, ὥστε with the indicative expressing actual result.

46.1   συσταθῆναι  ‘to be directed’, > συντείνω ‘direct’.

                                                     Chapter 47

47.   ὕδωρ ‘water’.  The customary drink was wine mixed with water.

47.   μὴ τοὺς ἀνδριάντας περιλάμβανε  ‘do not embrace statues’;  see Diogenes Laertius VI 23, the story of how Diogenes the Cynic got his tub to live in and how he would roll it on hot sand in the summer while in the winter he would embrace snow covered statues to keep himself used to hardship.

                                                     Chapter 48

48.1   See note of 5.10 where the topic is similar.

48.3   οὐ πεφρόντικεν  ‘he doesn’t give it a thought’;  for perfect in apodosis of future move vivid condition see Smyth 2526.b.

                                                    

                                                     Chapter 49

49.  ἐγεγράφει   ‘had written’, pluperfect, said to be rare in the protasis of past contrary to fact conditions (Smyth 2303).

49.   ἐπανάγνωθί  ‘read, read out’, (LSJ).

                                                     Chapter 50

50.   Lit. ‘Such things as are put before <you>, in these as though in laws, as though you will sin, should you disobey, remain’;  ὡς with the future participle not expressing purpose but taking on its conditional or restrictive meaning of ‘as if, as though’.

                                                     Chapter 51

51.1   διαιροῦντα λόγον ‘interpretive reasoning’;  διαιρέω ‘cleave in twain, divide into parts, break open, distinguish, determine, decide, interpret’ (L&S).

51.1   καὶ ἀεὶ προθέσεις ἐκ προθέσεως ποιῇ ‘and you always make postponements from postponement’, which must mean ‘postponement after postponement’.

51.1   καὶ ἡμέρας ἄλλας ἐπ' ἄλλαις ὁρίζῃς ‘and you set certain days to other days (and others to others)’.

                                                     Chapter 52

52.1   βεβαιωτικὸς καὶ διαρθρωτικός ‘confirmatory and articulating’ (LSJ);  both unusual adjectives; not superlatives.

52.2   ὁ δὲ ἀναγκαιότατος καὶ ὅπου ἀναπαύεσθαι δεῖ, ὁ πρῶτος The thought here is very practical, as it is throughout the Enchiridion.  It’s important to examine our precepts with the second and third level questioning mentioned, but we need to act and to act according to our first level precepts.  Yet we don’t.  We spend our time on the technicalities of level three and so, having ready at hand a proof of why it is necessary not to lie, we lie.

52.2   τοιγαροῦν ‘for that very reason, therefore’ (LSJ).

                                                     Chapter 53

53.1   ἑκτέον ‘it is necessary to have’;  for use of verbal adj. in –τεος impersonal construction with εἰμί or omitting it see Smyth 2149.2.

53.1   Πεπρωμένη ‘fate, destiny’, > πόρω ‘give, allot’, used with and without μοῖρα.

53.1   ἢν =  ἐάν

53.3   ταύτῃ ‘in this way, in this manner, so’;  sc. word such as ὁδός.

           The sources of these quotations are given by Simplicius⁸.

           ‘The first quotation is from Cleanthes the Stoic from Assos, who was the disciple of Zeno and the teacher of Chrysippus.  I saw a marvelous statue of him in Assos itself, set up by a decree of the Roman Senate in honor of the man.  He prays in these iambics to be led by god and by the creative and motive cause coming from him through all things in their order.  This he calls Fate and Destiny.’ (A modern reference to this quotation is Cleanthes SVF 1.527.⁹)

           ‘The second quotation is from Euripides the tragedian and is has the same meaning as the first’  (Euripides fr. 965 Nauck¹⁰).

           ‘The third quotation . . . is from the Crito of Plato and Socrates is speaking, and this expresses the same meaning more concisely’ (Crito d7-8).

           ‘The quotation added at the end . . . is from Plato’s Apology of Socrates and concerns Anytus and Melitus, his accusers.  It joins the end to the beginning reminding us of the statements at the beginning, that the person who places good and bad with the things that are under our control, and not with those outside our control, will not be compelled by anyone or hindered or ever harmed’ (Apology 30c).